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Legislative Committee Systems: A Design Perspective
CHASE STODDARD
INTRODUCTION
Committees are the defining characteristic of the modern legislature. While the centrality
and study of party politics goes back further than committee politics, the focus on committee
systems emerged over the course of the twentieth century, and legislatures could not function as
we understand them without this mechanism. The United States Congressional committee system
is the most studied system, yet virtually every country utilizes a committee system of some sort
within its legislature. Despite their ubiquity in and centrality to the operations of legislatures,
committees remain insufficiently studied, especially outside of the United States. The existing
body of work tends to look at an individual committee system or feature. This paper attempts to
funnel the existing body of work through a design lens in order to better understand what a
committee system is, what it does, and how it impacts other structures and actors.
The paper begins with an examination of committee system rules, looking to the legal
sources for these rules and the significance of two categories: jurisdiction and composition. The
second Part will explain six types of committees: standing, ad hoc, joint, conference, committees
of the whole, and subcommittees. Each type of committee is structured differently and is
expected to behave accordingly. The third Part explores the roles an individual committee could
play. A committee can fulfill any and all of these roles: gatekeeping, informational gathering and
dispersal, and resource negotiation and disbursement. The fourth Part enumerates the powers that
a committee can be given to fulfill its role: agenda setting, oversight and delegation of legislative
authority. The fifth Part will elucidate the concept of committee strength by exploring two
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categories of strength measurement: independence and cohesion. The sixth and final Part will
extrapolate the costs and benefits of a strong committee system, specifically looking at how
strength affects specialization of legislators, the quantity of work produced by a legislature, and
the speed of legislative processes. The paper will then conclude by applying concepts from the
preceding six Parts into potential design concerns—checking the executive branch and partisan
politics—before suggesting areas for future study.
I. LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE SYSTEM RULES
A legislative committee is a body operating beneath a main legislature or house, which
works on matters referred to it by the parent body.1 Beyond this basic conception, a committee
and the system it operates in can branch out in numerous directions. Understanding those paths
requires knowledge of their legal basis. Legislative committee rules are the foundation of
committee system operations and to understand them requires looking for the source of the rule
and the category of rule in question.
A. Sources of Committee Rules
To begin the study of any system, it is important to first examine the rules that bind the
system and shape its output. The rules for a committee can be found in constitutions, statutes,
and standing rules.
The clear majority of constitutions acknowledge the existence of legislative committees
and have at least minimal impacts on shaping their operations.2 Some constitutions merely

1

John D. Lees & Malcom Shaw, Introduction in COMMITTEES IN LEGISLATURES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 3, 3
(John D. Lees & Malcom Shaw eds., 1979).
2
Of the 190 constitutions available on the Constitute Project’s website, 161 constitutions (or 84.7%) address
legislative committees to some degree. See Search Results for “Legislative Committees,” CONSTITUTE PROJECT,
https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en&key=commit (last visited Mar. 30, 2018).
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authorize the legislature to create and utilize committees.3 Others presume their existence by
designating certain functions to committees generally or individually but do not address the
authority to create committees.4 The remaining constitutions authorize committee systems and
fall along a spectrum between assigning a general role (such as investigation)5 and assigning
explicit powers and creating specific committees.6
Beyond the constitution, rules governing committee systems can be found in statutes or
other rules promulgated by the legislature or committee itself. In the United States, committees
are governed by the Standing Rules of the Senate7 and the Rules of the House of
Representatives.8 Even in countries with constitutional provisions governing legislative
committees, these provisions often refer to standing rules or statutes for further guidance.9
B. Specific Rule Categories and Their Importance
There are common categories of rules across countries that affect the functioning of a
committee system. This section will address (1) jurisdictional and (2) compositional rules.
1. Jurisdictional Rules
The first rule category concerns jurisdiction and jurisdictional disputes. The power and
prestige of a committee is directly tied to its jurisdiction.10 Jurisdiction is defined here as the

For example, Ecuador’s constitution provides that “[t]o fulfill its attributions, the National Assembly shall set up
permanent specialized committees, in which all of its members shall participate. The law shall determine the
number, establishment, and competencies of each one.” CONSTITUCIÓN, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 125 (Ecuador).
4
India, along with many other countries, provides for immunity for any speech or vote made by a Member of
Parliament in a committee, but never directly authorizes the creation of committees. See INDIA CONST. art. 105, § 2.
5
CONST. OF GAMBIA, art. 109, § 2 (“Committees may be appointed to investigate or inquire into the activities or
administration of ministries or departments of the Government and such investigation or inquiry may extend to
making proposals for legislation or to investigate any matter of Public importance.”).
6
NEPALAKO SANVIDHANA [CONSTITUTION] 2015, art. 97 (Nepal).
7
See S. DOC. NO. 113-18, at 11–12, 19–39 (2013) [hereinafter Senate Rules].
8
See H.R. DOC. NO. 111-157, at 154–66 (2015) [hereinafter House Rules].
9
REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] 4:3 (Swed.) (“The Riksdag elects committees from among its members in accordance
with rules laid down in the Riksdag Act.”).
10
E.g., C. Lawrence Evans, Legislative Structure: Rules, Precedents, and Jurisdictions, 24 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 605, 610
(1999).
3
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policy issues that fall within a committee’s purview. Jurisdiction is defined within the rules that
create an individual committee. In the U.S. Congress, jurisdictional rules can be found in each
house’s standing rules. Standing Rule XXV of the Senate creates and defines each standing
committee, listing the issues under their respective jurisdictions.11 Although rare, some
constitutions address jurisdiction. One example is the Constitution of Pakistan which presumes a
“Finance Committee,” without defining the committee’s jurisdiction more specifically.12
Jurisdictional definitions are also found in the German Basic Law, which creates a Petitions
Committee and explicitly grants it the power to address petitions made to the legislature.13
While defining jurisdictions provides guidance on which committee controls a certain
policy area, bills may be introduced that cut across the jurisdiction of multiple committees. In
these instances, rules must be established to determine where legislation is considered.
Assignment of a piece of legislation to a particular committee can be left to the head of the
legislative body.14 When a piece of legislation clearly falls within the jurisdiction of multiple
committees, some states authorize the creation of an ad hoc committee to address these more
complex pieces of legislation.15 Other states authorize committees to request and exchange
11

For example, the Senate Judiciary Committee oversees matters relating to apportionment of representatives,
bankruptcy, mutiny, espionage, counterfeiting, civil liberties, Constitutional amendments, federal courts and judges,
holidays and celebrations, immigration and naturalization, interstate compacts, judicial proceedings, local courts,
measures relating to claims against the United States, national penitentiaries, patents, copyrights, trademarks,
protection of trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies, revision and codification of the
statutes of the United States, and state and territorial boundary lines. Jurisdiction, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/jurisdiction (last visited Mar. 30, 2018).
12
See PAKISTAN CONST. art. 88.
13
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 45c, translation at http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_gg/index.html (Ger.).
14
Senate Rules, supra note 8, at 12 (“Except as provided in paragraph 3, in any case in which a controversy arises as
to the jurisdiction of any committee with respect to any proposed legislation, the question of jurisdiction shall be
decided by the presiding officer, without debate, in favor of the committee which has jurisdiction over the subject
matter which predominates in such proposed legislation; but such decision shall be subject to an appeal.”).
15
Id. (“Upon motion by both the majority leader or his designee and the minority leader or his designee, proposed
legislation may be referred to two or more committees jointly or sequentially. Notice of such motion and the
proposed legislation to which it relates shall be printed in the Congressional Record. The motion shall be privileged,
but it shall not be in order until the Congressional Record in which the notice is printed has been available to
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reports when one committee is considering legislation that impacts another committee’s
jurisdiction.16 Committees can also agree to share jurisdiction with another committee over a
matter that affects multiple subject areas.17 Regardless of the methodology, a clear mechanism of
assignment of bills and resolution of jurisdictional disputes must be established to avoid costly
time delays.
2. Compositional Rules
Another type of rule governs the number and composition of committees. These rules
directly impact the level of expertise each committee member has in the committee’s jurisdiction
and the amount of work each committee can accomplish. The number of standing committees
will typically be set by the rules, with the number of subcommittees either set by the legislature
or the parent committee. Some constitutions create and authorize a limited number of

Senators for at least twenty-four hours. No amendment to any such motion shall be in order except amendments to
any instructions contained therein. Debate on any such motion, and all amendments thereto and debatable motions
and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than two hours, the time to be equally divided
between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.”)
16
E.g., RIKSDAGSORDNINGEN [RO] [CONSTITUTION] 4:8, translation at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Sweden_2012.pdf?lang=en (Swed.) (“A committee may provide
another committee with an opportunity to deliver an opinion concerning a matter or an issue affecting that
committee's area of competence. Before a committee delivers a report containing proposals in a matter which has
been raised in the Riksdag, the Committee on Finance shall be provided with an opportunity to comment, if the
proposal could have significant future repercussions for public revenue and expenditure. If, during the consideration
of a matter, at least five members of a committee so request, the committee shall obtain an opinion under paragraph
one. The same shall apply if such a request has been put forward unconnected with the consideration of a matter, if
the question relates to European Union activities. The committee may reject a request for an opinion if it is put
forward during the consideration of a matter and the committee concludes that the action requested would so delay
consideration of the matter that serious detriment would result. In such a case, the committee shall state in its report
its reasons for rejecting the request. A committee may reach agreement [sic] with one or more other committees to
prepare a matter jointly through deputies on a joint committee.”).
17
Evans, supra note 11.
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committees,18 while others leave it to the legislature to create committees as it deems
necessary.19
The assignment of members to committees is also a significant rule category. Many states
acknowledge the existence of multiple political parties and require that the parties be represented
proportionately on committees.20 This can create problems though for smaller parties who have
fewer legislators to fill their reserved seats in the committees.21 The specific assignment of a
legislator to a committee is typically made along party lines.22 This can be determined by the
party leadership to accommodate needs and requests of legislators,23 or the assignment can be
made through seniority method with more senior party members getting the more prestigious
assignments.24
II. COMMITTEE TYPES
This section will explore the various types of committees found throughout the world.
Not all systems will feature all types of committees, nor will they be found under the same name,
but any committee could be filed under one of these categories. The types of committees

E.g., CONST OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA, July 5, 1995, art. 73 (“There may be not more than twelve standing
committees established in the National Assembly.” However this may be less limiting than it appears, as it does not
necessarily restrict the number of subcommittees.).
19
E.g., CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, art. 103, § 2 (“Parliament shall appoint standing committees and
other committees as may be necessary for the effective discharge of its functions.”).
20
E.g., Art. 72 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“[The Rules] may also establish when and how the consideration and
approval of bills may be referred to Committees, including Standing Committees, composed so as to reflect the
proportion of the Parliamentary Groups.”).
21
William E. Crowther & David M. Olson, Committee Systems in New Democratic Parliaments: Comparative
Institutionalization, in COMMITTEES IN POST-COMMUNIST DEMOCRATIC PARLIAMENTS 171, 187 (William E.
Crowther & David M. Olson eds., 2002).
22
John D. Lees, Committees in the United States Congress, in COMMITTEES IN LEGISLATURES: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 11, 24–25 (John D. Lees & Malcom Shaw eds., 1979) (“House Rule X stipulates that at the beginning of
each Congress (1) all standing committee vacancies shall be filled by election by the House…In practice, decisions
on vacancies are made by party committees with the House normally ratifying the decisions.”).
23
See Robert J. Jackson, Committees in the Philippine Congress, in COMMITTEES IN LEGISLATURES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 148, 173 (John D. Lees & Malcom Shaw eds., 1979).
24
Lees, supra note 24, at 25 (exploring the seniority system in committee assignments and its critique).
18
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examined in this section are as follows: standing committees; ad hoc committees; joint
committees; conference committees; committees of the whole; and subcommittees.
A. Standing Committees
Standing committees are the most common type of committee found around the world.
They are most often referred to as standing committees but sometimes are referred to as
permanent committees.25 The defining characteristic of a standing committee is that it is more
permanent in nature and is set within the system’s rules.26 Thus, the number and jurisdiction of
standing committees tend to be more stable over time than other committees.27 Although the
functions of these committees will depend on their jurisdiction and the country in question,
standing committees tend to have a greater focus on considering legislation than other types of
committees.28 Additionally, there is a special type of standing committee that exists when the
legislature is not in session.29
B. Ad Hoc Committees
Ad hoc committees are another common feature of committee systems, but these
committees are more varied in their names. Ad hoc committees are also commonly known as
select30 or special31 committees. These committees are formed for a single legislative session and
have a far more restricted jurisdiction. The functions of these committees will vary depending on

25

E.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 58 (Braz.).
E.g., Senate Rules, supra note 8, at 19–31.
27
Lees, supra note 24, at 21.
28
Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 85, 87 (1987).
29
E.g., CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA 2010, art. 156 (“The Standing committee is a National Assembly body
which functions[:] a. Outside periods in which the Assembly of the Republic is in full session; b. Between the end of
one legislature and the beginning of a new one; c. In any other cases stipulated in the Constitution.”).
30
E.g., Electoral Act 1993, pt 9, s 264 (N.Z.).
31
E.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 135.
26

7

the purpose of their creation, but ad hoc committees tend to be more investigatory than
deliberative.32
An exceptional instance of ad hoc committees is the emergency committee, an ad hoc
committee created in response to a state of emergency declared by the executive branch.33 This
committee operates while the remainder of legislative functions tends to diminish or disappear
for the duration of the emergency.34 These committees are given powers comparable to the larger
legislative body in terms of magnitude, but their jurisdiction is limited to matters arising from the
emergency.35 While these committees are comparable to other ad hoc committees in their
presumed limited time frame, their powers are exceptionally expansive.
C. Joint Committees
Joint committees are a feature of bicameral legislatures. These committees are composed
of members from each house and address issues concerning the operation of the collective
legislature.36 These committees can simplify deliberative and investigative functions that would
normally be shared between the two houses and strengthen the legislature’s collective position
on this issue in relation to the executive.
D. Conference Committees
Conference committees are another feature of bicameral legislatures. When legislation
passes through both houses, a conference committee forms to negotiate the inconsistencies
between the two drafts.37 These committees are generally composed of equal members from both

32

An exception to this can be found in the United Kingdom, where ad hoc committees form to consider bills that are
introduced. David Arter, Committee Cohesion and the ‘Corporate Dimension’ of Parliamentary Committees: A
Comparative Analysis, in COHESION AND DISCIPLINE IN LEGISLATURES 73, 75 (Rueven Y. Hazan ed., 1979).
33
E.g., CONST. OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA [PAPUA N.G.] Aug. 15, 1975, art. 240.
34
PAPUA N.G. art. 241.
35
PAPUA N.G. art. 242.
36
E.g., S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 45.
37
E.g., CONST. OF AFGHANISTAN [AFG.] Jan. 26, 2004, art. 100.
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houses of the legislature.38 If a conference committee can reach an agreed upon version of the
bill, it then proceeds along the legislative path as the rules normally dictate—typically moving to
the executive branch for approval.39 If a compromise cannot be reached, the committee is
disbanded and the bills return to the respective houses.40 Although some states use the term
“joint committees” to refer to conference committees, the two categories are conceptually
distinct. A conference committee has no power to address any matter beyond the text of the bills
assigned to it, whereas a joint committee operates more comparably to a standing or ad hoc
committee, but with the benefit of representing both houses. Interviews with legislators indicate
that conference committees create less competition between the two houses and more
collaboration between legislators with similar interests (such as the policy jurisdiction of the
inciting bill).41
E. Committees of the Whole
A committee of the whole is the least common type of committee, with most examples
found in members of the British Commonwealth and other former British colonies.42 A
committee of the whole is when the legislature or one of the houses sits together but utilizes
committee procedural rules rather than traditional floor procedure.43 Although it is a type of
committee, committees of the whole should generally be considered distinct from a committee
system overall. A traditional purpose for having and utilizing a committee of the whole was to

38

E.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 70.
See AFG. art. 100.
40
Id.
41
Francesco D’Onofrio, Committees in the Italian Parliament, in COMMITTEES IN LEGISLATURES: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS (John D. Lees & Malcom Shaw eds., 1979) at 61.
42
See PARLIAMENT OF CAN., COMMITTEES OF THE WHOLE HOUSE—HOUSE OF COMMONS PROCEDURE AND
PRACTICE (2d ed. 2009); RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 2–3, https://www.legco.gov.hk/general/english/procedur/content/rop.pdf; House Rules,
supra note 9, at 770–98.
43
E.g., House Rules, supra note 9, at 770–98.
39
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avoid the public record that accompanied traditional floor procedure.44 While committees of the
whole utilize committee procedures, they do not result in the same costs and benefits that result
from the rest of a committee system.
F. Subcommittees
Subcommittees are smaller committees formed within the jurisdiction of a larger
committee. A subcommittee’s creation and functions are typically left to the discretion of the
parent committee,45 and their precise role can vary between systems or parent committees.
III. COMMITTEE ROLE
Another important aspect of an individual committee is its role or purpose. This can be
both formal and informal, and a single committee can fulfill multiple roles. The roles can be
divided into three main categories: gatekeeping; information gathering and dispersal; and
resource negotiation and distribution.
A. Gatekeeping
One of the most powerful roles that a committee can play is gatekeeping. Most often this
is seen in terms of legislating. Many systems require that before a bill can be considered by the
main body, it must be referred to the committee with the appropriate jurisdiction.46 Committees
then have the opportunity to review, rewrite, and report on the bill—depending on the rules of
the particular committee system—to the main body.47 While real gatekeeping (preventing a bill
from reaching a floor vote) is the most effective way to fulfill this role, research indicates that

44

Committee FAQs, OFFICE OF THE CLERK: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://clerk.house.gov/committee_info/commfaq.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2018).
45
E.g., BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBL No. 1/1930, art. 23k, ¶ 2,
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/geltendefassung.wxe?abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10000138 (Austria).
46
E.g., CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON 1972, art. 29, § 1.
47
E.g., 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 3 (Greece), art. 68.
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normative gatekeeping (recommending a course of action) is also effective.48 The legislature
follows the recommendations of the committee more often than not.49 U.S. Congressional
committees are prime examples of successful gatekeepers. A study of bills introduced in the
House of Representatives in 1967 indicated that 93.6% of the bills died in committee, and a
study of Senate bills in the same period found that 66.6% died in committee.50
Committees can also play a gatekeeping role in non-legislative ways. Committees can be
involved in the appointment process of executive and judicial branch positions. A prominent
example of the extent of a committee’s gatekeeping power in this area is the refusal of the U.S.
Senate Judiciary Committee to hold a hearing for Judge Merrick Garland when he was
nominated to the Supreme Court by President Obama51—the committee also refused to hold
hearings for many other judicial nominations made by President Barack Obama.52 When
President Donald Trump subsequently nominated Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, the
Judiciary Committee scheduled and held hearings within forty-eight days of the nomination.53
Committees can use gatekeeping powers to control what items move forward and at what pace.
B. Information Gathering and Dispersal
A second role that committees play is in information gathering and dispersal. The breadth
of subject matter that falls before a legislature requires legislators to have access to information
on a wide variety of matters. Committees address this need in different ways. While hearings

48

MICHAEL L. MEZEY, COMPARATIVE LEGISLATURES 67 (1979).
Id.
50
Id. at 69.
51
Richard Cowan, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Grassley Tells Garland No Hearings, REUTERS (Apr. 12,
2016, 10:28 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-garland-idUSKCN0X91OO.
52
Burgess Everett, Conservatives: No More Obama Nominees, POLITICO (Jan. 12, 2016, 5:10 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/01/obama-nominations-blocked-senate-judges-217589.
53
Richard Pérez-Peña, Hearing for Neil Gorsuch, Supreme Court Nominee, Is Set for March, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-senate-hearing.html.
49
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play a role in gatekeeping, they play a more significant role in information gathering.54 Hearings
give legislators a forum to question people on the issue before the committee. They give the
committee members the opportunity to gather information that may not have been readily
available from other sources or to delve deeper into particular points of fact.55 Many systems
grant committees the same power as a court to compel testimony from certain entities and
individuals.56 The information gathering capacity of a committee contributes to the expertise of
its members.
Dispersing information is as important as gathering. While the committee is most directly
tied to its subject matter, the larger body needs information to make rational voting decisions.
The committee can help the legislature stay connected to the public by communicating the
legislature’s work and findings and keeping the public apprised of what the government is doing.
This role is mostly filled through the drafting and publishing of reports57 but could also be
performed through press conferences and other media engagements.
Information summary and dispersion are not roles that are as expansive or even present in
all systems. Some constitutions close committee proceedings and hearings to the public but
mandate that a record be made publicly available.58
C. Resource Negotiation and Distribution
Though less formally acknowledged, resource negotiation and distribution is at the heart
of legislative functions, and the committee is a prime forum for this work. Particularly in single
member district voting systems, an individual legislator is incentivized to provide material
54

Lees, supra note 24, at 37.
Id. at 38.
56
E.g., C.F. art. 58, § 4 (Braz.).
57
E.g., CONSTITUCIÓN 1949, art.121, §23 (Costa Rica).
58
E.g., SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI [S.P.] [CONSTITUTION] June 11, 1999, § 50, translation at
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf (Fin.).
55
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benefits for her constituents.59 This gives committees that have a direct role in budgetary and
appropriation matters a greater prestige. One study of legislators in the Philippines found that a
legislator’s opinion of the prestige a certain committee assignment was directly tied to that
committee’s ability to provide material benefit to the legislator’s constituents.60 Other important
resources traded at the committee level are political clout and voting. A committee’s power in
other areas—such as gatekeeping—gives legislators incentive to negotiate with its members,
especially legislators who have a vested interest in matters before a committee to which they are
not assigned.61 Some theorists suggest that jurisdictional boundaries should be drawn to promote
the most trading of influence between committees.62
IV. COMMITTEE POWERS
Related to function, but from a different perspective, is a committee’s powers. Explicit
powers assigned to a committee are the most direct method to understand a committee’s power
and the strength of the overall committee system. The two broad categories of powers are agenda
setting and oversight.
A. Agenda Setting
Agenda setting powers let a committee perform its gatekeeping function and control the
legislative process in its jurisdiction. These powers can be both positive and negative. On the
positive side of agenda setting is the power to initiate legislation. Some committee systems
require that bills considered before a committee be offered by a member of that committee.63
This gives an immense amount of power to members of the committee, as any other political

59

Lees, supra note 24, at 22.
Jackson, supra note 25, at 162.
61
Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 30, at 88; Evans, supra note 11, at 611.
62
Evans, supra note 11, at 611.
63
E.g., CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES June 21, 1993, art. 104, § 4.
60
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player that wishes to put up a bill for consideration must partner with a member of that
committee and persuade that member to offer the bill.
Negative agenda setting is the power to keep matters away from the committee or
legislature.64 An example of negative agenda setting power would be giving a committee
discretion at what bills it chooses to consider. In systems where a bill must be considered by a
committee before it is considered by the parent body, a committee can choose what bills to
consider. The committee then has the power to keep any legislation off the agenda that it does
not like or that it believes will be politically costly.65 Negative agenda setting is more powerful
than positive agenda setting.66
A specialized form of negative agenda setting and the most significant legislative power
potentially available is the ex post veto. This is an agenda setting power of a conference
committee.67 This committee takes the corresponding bills from each house and reconciles the
two texts. The ex post veto gives the committee the power to cut provisions it does not like or to
kill the bills altogether. Although these are committees specially formed for the purpose of
reconciling the bills, the membership of a conference committee is typically drawn from the
committees where the bills were initially referred, giving the initial committees additional
agenda setting powers in an indirect manner.68

64

Sean Gailmard & Jeffery A. Jenkins, Negative Agenda Control in the Senate and House: Fingerprints of Majority
Party Power, 69 J. OF POLITICS 689, 690 (2007).
65
MEZEY, supra note , at 70.
66
David P. Baron & John Ferejohn, The Power to Propose, in MODELS OF STRATEGIC CHOICE IN POLITICS 11, 14
(Peter C. Ordeshook ed., 1989).
67
See Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 30, at 89, 95.
68
See id. at 95–96.
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B. Oversight
Oversight powers are what give a committee the ability to check the executive branch.
Particularly, this oversight power comes in the form of hearings. The modern welfare state in
many democracies requires government to monitor and administer increasingly sprawling
programs.69 Some states give committees the power to oversee these programs through hearings
or other investigatory processes in order to check executive power.70 The committee can also
perform oversight if it has a role in approving the nominated head of a particular department.71
C. Delegation of Law Making
There are other powers that can be found in a committee system but are overall too
uncommon to generalize to systems. For instance, some systems provide for the delegation of the
power to pass legislation from the full legislature to an individual committee. Committees in
Italy have the power to pass bills without referral to the parent body.72 This power does not apply
to budgetary, electoral, and constitutional matters.73 Although a study demonstrates that this
power to pass bills in committee is almost exclusively used in matters that are not politically
divisive, it theoretically opens the door to immense abuse of power by a rogue committee.74
Other committee systems incorporate the capacity to delegate to a committee the power to pass
legislation, but this is not presumed as in Italy. In this formulation, a vote of some percentage of
the main legislative body is required to delegate the power to pass a specific bill to a specific

69

Lees, supra note 24, at 14.
Crowther & Olson, supra note 23, at 189 (suggesting that merely providing the power does not guarantee its use).
71
See 1958 CONST. art. 13 (Fr.).
72
Art. 72 Cost. (It.).
73
Id.
74
Lees, supra note 23.
70
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committee.75 If the main legislative body wishes to undo the delegation a second vote is
required.76
V. COMMITTEE SYSTEM METRICS
Committees and committee systems are often spoken of in terms of strength, but what
constitutes strength in this context? There are two primary metrics that collectively contribute to
a relative conception of a committee’s strength: independence and cohesion.
A. Independence
Independence is a method of examining a committee as a unit in its relationship with
other political units, like the parent legislative body or the executive branch. A committee is
more independent if it is able to operate without interference from outside forces. The powers
assigned to a committee are central to this measurement. Agenda setting powers determine if a
committee controls the legislative matters in its jurisdiction. If a committee has fewer or weaker
powers in this area, the committee’s grasp on the legislation lessens, and the door is open to a
take-over. Oversight could also play a role in independence by keeping a check on other players
and preventing them from overstepping their boundaries and infringing on committee powers.
Amongst committees, independence is a self-reinforcing mechanism. As a committee
becomes more independent, other committees or legislators are less likely to act against it.77 The
fear is that, because a committee cannot be defeated within its jurisdiction, any attempted action
against a committee will only result in retaliation.78 Another theory is that to avoid threats to its
independence, a committee will attempt to accommodate other committees’ wishes ex ante.79
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B. Cohesion
Cohesion is a measurement that comes from the analysis of political party behavior, and
it is now used in the analysis of committees and committee systems. The work on political party
cohesion can be traced back to Ergun Ozbudun.80 He defined cohesion as “the extent to which, in
any given situation, group members can be observed to work together for the group’s goals in
one and the same way.”81 Put in other terms, cohesion can be viewed as the extent to which a
group acts as a single entity rather than a collection of individuals.82 In a committee context, this
can be viewed as the difference between a committee as an actor and as an arena.
Choice of committee type will impact cohesion. Standing committees will likely become
more cohesive as the committee members will work together more over a longer period of time
when compared to other committee types.83 In contrast, ad hoc committees should likely be the
least cohesive as they have a more clearly defined end point. Regardless of committee type,
stability in committee membership over time will also increase cohesive behavior.84 Cohesion
doesn’t necessarily lead to non-divisive political outcomes, but it does describe the behavior of
the legislators internally. Thus, stability in committee membership increases the internalization
of committee norms and leads to a more efficient entity.
The powers assigned to a committee will also impact cohesion. The more empowered a
committee is to act, the more benefit a legislator derives from being a member of the committee.
This promotes stronger identification with the committee and makes it more likely that a
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legislator will choose the interests of the committee over the interests of the party if forced to
choose.
Related to the concept of cohesion is the concept of discipline. Discipline is cohesion
enforced through obedience or the system of rules and behavior that leads to obedience.85
“Discipline starts where cohesion falters.”86 In the committee context, discipline is less
important. As of publication, I am aware of no rule which would allow a committee to punish an
individual member. The corollary to discipline might be viewed as incentivizing policies. This is
more useful in a committee context as committees often have power and other resources at their
disposal that encourage commitment to the cohesion of a committee without explicitly punishing
non-commitment.
VI. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A STRONG COMMITTEE SYSTEM
Once committee strength is understood, it is important to examine what strength
accomplishes and whether it is a positive or negative phenomenon. The positive or negative
aspect is often a matter of political perspective. There are four primary costs and benefits of a
strong committee system: specialization, quantity of work product, speed of legislative process,
and separation of powers.
The biggest benefit of a committee system is specialization and the expertise it confers.
As a central tenet of economic theory, specialized labor breeds expertise in that labor.87 By
dividing a legislature’s work amongst discrete committees, it allows members of those
committees to gain specialization in that subject matter.88 This relates back to committee
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assignments and how those rules operate. The more stable committee assignments are from
session to session, the greater the expertise the members of those committees accumulate.89 By
staying on a committee and spending more time devoted to its subject matter, a legislator
becomes better able to understand that subject matter, legislate to the common good, and enact
the interests of her constituents.
This expertise comes with a cost, and that is in knowledge of other committees’
jurisdiction. When a legislator specializes in the subject matter of her committee assignment, she
becomes more dependent on the knowledge and expertise of others when considering matters
outside her committee’s jurisdiction.90 This also confers influence on committee members,
letting them act as gateways to their jurisdiction.91 The expertise gained in the subject matter and
the powers of the respective committee grants members greater power to bring to bear within the
committee and peddle outside the committee.
Another benefit, or cost, of a strong committee system is the total amount of work
accomplished by a legislature.92 If all matters before a legislature had to be considered by the
whole body and no other, this would dramatically reduce the number of matters that could be
considered at all. The existence of a committee system creates a layer of actors that consider
matters before they appear before everyone else. As a basic example, if there were only two
committees in a system, these two committees could accomplish twice the work of a single body
in the same time span, all other factors remaining constant. At a certain threshold, there are
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diminishing returns on creating more committees, as the limited number of legislators to fill
those committees cannot attend more than a single committee at any given moment.93
The strength of a committee system impacts the speed of legislative process, but the exact
effect may not be clear in every situation. On the one hand, a strong committee could quickly
consider bills presented to it and report its findings to the parent body. The parent body’s
deference to the work of that committee allows the matter to be resolved quickly by the full
legislature. On the other hand, a strong committee system can also refuse to consider bills and
resist the pressure to pass legislation, hold hearings for nominees, or refer bills upwards,
effectively slowing or killing the legislative process. The exact effect strength will have in terms
of speed will depend on a number of factors.
VII. CONCLUSIONS (HOW TO DESIGN A COMMITTEE SYSTEM)
Legislative committee systems are immensely complex and crucial to understanding the
functionality of a legislature. The preceding six sections each examine one aspect of a committee
system. These aspects are not isolated from each other, and it is only in summation that the
ultimate impact of committee system design might be understood. This conclusion will explore a
totalizing view of committee system design and how it might impact a larger constitutional
design project with an eye towards two hypothetical goals: (1) checking the executive branch and
(2) promoting political party building.
Proper committee system design can empower a legislature to act as an effective check
on the executive branch. In terms of committee roles, both gatekeeping and informational
gathering and dispersal will be important. Gatekeeping and the associated agenda powers will
give committees and the legislature leverage in determining the substance of laws and other
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negotiations with the executive branch. Informational committees will empower other
committees to act as more effective gatekeepers and to precisely employ its oversight capacities
where they are needed. The number of committees per legislator should be kept low in order to
promote specialization, which will weaken the legislature’s reliance on the executive branch for
expertise. At least a portion of the rules that create this system should be written into the text of
the constitution in order to discourage executive overreach and prevent later sessions from giving
away ground.
As discussed in terms of committee cohesion, party strength and committee system
strength are often in tension with each other. Committee members will be less beholden to the
party line in a system where more power is given to a committee. If the committee can give
greater benefits to the legislator than a party can, then the legislator will be incentivized to
promote committee interests over party interests. However, strong committee systems and strong
party systems are not mutually exclusive. To promote party building and party politics through
committee system design, greater emphasis on the rules of committee composition and
assignment will be needed. If a political party is better able to reward loyalty through
advantageous committee assignments, this will incentivize legislators to prioritize the party. This
is not a guarantee, as was seen in the case of the Philippines.94 As with all design concerns,
context matters. If the political culture does not prioritize loyalty, giving parties the ability to
reward loyalty will not guarantee that outcome.
These are just two areas in which the potentials of committee system design can be
understood. However, this remains speculative. Despite the ubiquity of legislative committees
around the world, there are still significant gaps in the literature. This area of study could benefit
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from more extensive data analysis. Much of the existing work falls either into theoretical
modeling or anecdotal case studies.95 With more precise data gathering and analysis, the exact
effects of an individual design choice should become more readily apparent. Legislative
committees show no sign of giving ground, and any new study can only help future design
processes.
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